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While A-Rod and Sammy Sosa lent the Ninth Circuit’s August 
2009 opinion in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. a ge-
nerous dose of star power, the case was about much more than Major 
League Baseball.  It not only involved the investigation that led to the 
shocking revelation that four of baseball’s most beloved players—
Alex Rodriguez, David Ortiz, Manny Ramirez, and Sammy Sosa—
tested positive for steroid use in 2003,1 but also created shockwaves 
among observers and commentators for its implications regarding 
the Fourth Amendment.  While much of the media frenzy associated 
with the case focused on the “Steroid Era” of baseball, the decision 
raised serious questions regarding the extent to which law enforce-
ment officials may seize digital evidence in compliance with the 
Fourth Amendment.2 
 
 1 Michael S. Schmidt, Stars of Red Sox Title Years Are Linked to Doping, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 
2009, at A1 (“Baseball first tested for steroids in 2003, and the results from that season 
were supposed to remain anonymous.  But for reasons that have never been made clear, 
the results were not destroyed and the first batch of positives has come to be known 
among fans and people in baseball as ‘the list.’”). 
 2 See, e.g., Michael McCann, Remaining Names on Drug List Likely to Remain Under Seal Indefi-
nitely, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 26, 2009, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2009/
writers/michael_mccann/08/26/mlb.drug.list.ruling/index.html (“While U.S. v. Compre-
hensive Drug Testing serves as an important decision for the Fourth Amendment’s applica-
tion to electronically stored information, it also impacts the potential disclosure of the 
remaining 97 names, which have been sealed by court order.”). 
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What began as a Ninth Circuit opinion designed to address 
whether federal agents exceeded the scope of their search warrant in 
seizing electronic records about steroid use for over one hundred 
Major League Baseball players, quickly developed into a preventative 
guide on avoiding the dangers inherent in computer searches.3  In 
response to the notion that current Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence is tailored around the search and seizure of physical objects 
and is ill-equipped to accommodate the rapidly growing and chang-
ing needs of an increasingly electronic world, the Ninth Circuit’s en 
banc majority opinion in Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. set out strict 
and detailed guidelines to be followed by all federal officials conduct-
ing computer searches.  These requirements included the elimina-
tion of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement and the 
specification that all segregation and redaction of electronic data 
during a police investigation must be conducted by an independent 
third party or trained computer forensic personnel. 
While these guidelines were later relegated to a non-binding con-
currence in an amended opinion authored by the Ninth Circuit in 
September 2010,4 the limitations on agents as set forth in the en banc 
opinion are critical to understanding the complex law that is develop-
ing around searches and seizures of electronic data, particularly how 
the plain view exception to the warrant requirement should be ap-
plied to computer searches.  Part I of this Comment will attempt to 
address this issue by first providing an overview of the Fourth 
Amendment and warranted searches, highlighting the difference be-
tween computer and physical searches in the application of the plain 
view doctrine.  It will then discuss the plain view doctrine as it existed 
before Horton v. California and the abrogation of the inadvertence re-
quirement, arguing that the doctrine, post-Horton, is becoming in-
creasingly inadequate in the face of advancing technology.  Parts II, 
III, and IV will examine the case law surrounding computer searches 
and the plain view doctrine in the Ninth Circuit, as well as that Cir-
cuit’s recent decisions in United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 
Inc.—both the original en banc opinion and the amended version—
and will discuss the various reasons the Ninth Circuit appropriately 
decided to amend the decision.  Finally, Parts V and VI will describe 
 
 3 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(“This case is . . . about the procedures and safeguards that federal courts must observe in 
issuing and administering search warrants and subpoenas for electronically stored infor-
mation.”). 
 4 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., No. 05-10067, 2010 WL 3529247 (9th 
Cir. Sept. 13, 2010) (per curiam). 
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the circuit split that exists around how the plain view doctrine should 
be applied to computer searches and will argue that the intent-based 
approach of the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, which restores the inad-
vertence requirement to the plain view doctrine, is the better and 
more effective alternative. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 
The Fourth Amendment provides:   
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . particularly de-
scribing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.5 
The Fourth Amendment incorporates a strong preference for search 
warrants.  In determining whether search warrants are required, the 
Court has viewed searches and seizures in light of a reasonableness 
test, as defined by Katz v. United States, which asks whether an individ-
ual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the item or items 
searched or seized.6  Traditionally, warrantless searches were general-
ly considered unreasonable, save for a few “jealously and carefully 
drawn” exceptions.7  The primary Fourth Amendment enforcement 
doctrine, the Exclusionary Rule, was first developed by the Supreme 
Court in 1914.8  In Weeks v. United States, the Court held that any evi-
dence obtained by the police in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
must be excluded from evidence in court.9  Thus, evidence obtained 
without a warrant may be subject to the Exclusionary Rule. 
Today, exceptions to the warrant requirement have largely swal-
lowed the rule.  Indeed, “[m]odern search and seizure law is astoun-
dingly complex and contradictory.”10  A partial list of modern excep-
tions to the warrant requirement include:  “exigent circumstances 
(such as flight or destruction of evidence), the direct observation of 
 
 5 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 6 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth 
Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the pres-
ence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.”). 
 7 MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:  CASES, STATUTES AND 
EXECUTIVE MATERIALS 43 (3d ed. 2007). 
 8 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (“We therefore reach the conclusion 
that the letters in question were taken from the house of the accused by an official of the 
United States acting under color of his office in direct violation of the constitutional 
rights of the defendant . . . . In holding them and permitting their use upon the trial, we 
think prejudicial error was committed.”). 
 9 Id. 
 10 MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 44. 
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crime, plain view, open fields, community caretaker functions, brief 
investigative stops, brief frisks for weapons, inventory searches, pro-
tective sweeps, automobile searches, border searches, school 
searches, [and] prison searches.”11 
Under the plain view exception to the warrant requirement, po-
lice officers may seize an object without a warrant if:  1) the officers 
are lawfully in the position from which they view the object; 2) the 
object’s incriminating character is immediately apparent; and 3) the 
officers have a lawful right of access to the object.12  In Horton v. Cali-
fornia, the Supreme Court held that while inadvertence is a factor to 
be considered in determining the legitimacy of a plain view seizure, 
that factor alone is not dispositive.13  In Horton, a California police of-
ficer obtained and executed a warrant to search the defendant’s 
home for the proceeds of a robbery.  While the officer did not find 
the proceeds, he did find and seize weapons in plain view.14  Though 
the officer later admitted that he was interested in finding evidence 
unassociated with the robbery, the Supreme Court did not exclude 
the evidence from the search.  The Court reasoned that the: 
 suggestion that the inadvertence requirement is necessary to prevent the 
police from conducting general searches, or from converting specific 
warrants into general warrants, is not persuasive because that interest is 
already served by the requirements that no warrant issue unless it ‘partic-
ularly describ[es] the place to be searched and the persons or things to 
be seized.’15   
The scope of the search was not enlarged by the failure to mention 
weapons in the warrant.  The Court used an analogy to illustrate their 
point:  “Police with a warrant for a rifle may search only places where 
rifles might be and must terminate the search once the rifle is found; 
the inadvertence rule will in no way reduce the number of places into 
which they may lawfully look.”16 
 
 11 Id. 
 12 See 68 AM. JUR. 2D Sales and Use Taxes § 101 (1973) (describing the extended scope of giv-
en consent); see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (holding that the police 
may seize an object if detected through touch during a protective search). 
 13 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990) (“We conclude that even though inadver-
tence is a characteristic of most legitimate ‘plain-view’ seizures, it is not a necessary condi-
tion.”). 
 14 Id. at 128. 
 15 Id. at 139 (internal citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
 16 Id. at 141 (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 517 (1971)). 
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A. Computer Searches Versus Physical Searches 
“Existing rules of criminal procedure are naturally tailored to the 
facts of physical-world crimes.”17  In United States v. Katz, the Supreme 
Court famously stated that the Fourth Amendment protects “people, 
not places.”18  Yet, as Justice Harlan noted in his Katz concurrence, 
the protection provided to people “requires reference to a ‘place.’”19  
While some courts have attempted to liken computers to physically-
closed containers, such as suitcases,20 in an attempt to fit computer 
searches into existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, other 
courts and commentators have advocated for a “special approach” to 
the investigation of electronic data.21 
The particularity requirement, explicit in the text of the Fourth 
Amendment, requires that a search warrant describe the place to be 
 
 17 Orin S. Kerr, Digital Evidence and the New Criminal Procedure, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 290 
(2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Digital Evidence].  Kerr, a professor at George Washington Uni-
versity Law School, has written extensively on the differences between physical and elec-
tronic searches and the difficulties of applying the Fourth Amendment to digital evi-
dence.  See also Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531 
(2005) [hereinafter Kerr, Searches and Seizures] (discussing how the Fourth Amendment 
applies to electronic storage devices). 
 18 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
 19 Id. at 361; see also Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 17, at 290 (“Under Justice Harlan’s 
formulation, the Fourth Amendment remains heavily tied to places . . . .”). 
 20 See Donald Resseguie, Computer Searches and Seizures, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 185, 204–05 
n.197 (2000) (“A number of other cases allowed for wholesale seizure of computer 
equipment for later off-site sorting without additional approval from a magistrate essen-
tially applying the closed container analogy to computer equipment.  See United States v. 
Longo, 70 F. Supp. 2d 225 (W.D.N.Y. 1999) (allowing broad search of computer files); 
United States v. Gawrysiak, 972 F. Supp. 853 (D.N.J. 1997) (seizing all computer files 
without determination of those relevant to the scope of the search warrant was permissi-
ble and did not allow for blanket suppression of all evidence), aff’d, 178 F.3d 1281 (3d 
Cir. 1999); United States v. Kufrovich, 997 F. Supp. 246 (D. Conn. 1997) (permitting 
blanket seizure of computer without any on-site sorting for evidence relevant to the crime 
under investigation); United States v. Stewart, No. CRIM.A. 96-583, 1997 WL 189381 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 16, 1997) (allowing seizure of all computer hardware and software along 
with a large quantity of documents for later review off-site); United States v. Hersch, No. 
CRIM.A. 93-10339-Z, 1994 WL 568728 (D. Mass. Sept. 27, 1994) (finding that a search 
warrant calling for the seizure of all computer hardware, software and related equipment 
was not a general search given the complexity of the scheme under investigation).”). 
 21 See Derek Regensburger, Bytes, Balco, and Barry Bonds:  An Exploration of the Law Concerning 
the Search and Seizure of Computer Files and an Analysis of the Ninth Circuit’s Decision in United 
States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1151, 1155 
(2007) (acknowledging these approaches and noting that “a computer . . . is anything 
and everything a user wants it to be—a file cabinet containing thousands of personal files 
or business records, a personal accountant, a photo album, a music or movie player, a vir-
tual desk complete with calendar and Rolodex, a research librarian, or a video game ma-
chine”). 
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searched or the item to be seized.22  This requirement ensures that 
the scope of the police’s search remains as narrow as possible.  With 
physical evidence, this is a fairly straight-forward requirement.  A war-
rant is suitably particular if it details “general classifications of the 
items to be seized,” which would allow an officer to “ascertain and 
identify with reasonable certainty” the items to be seized.23  Further, 
“[t]he seizure must be limited to the evidence described in the war-
rant—which itself is limited by the scope of probable cause to believe 
that the evidence is on the premises—as well as other evidence dis-
covered in plain view during the course of the search.”24  In physical 
places, the particularity requirement restricts the scope of a search to 
a home, room, closet, or drawer, and prevents a specific warrant from 
becoming a general warrant.25  Under the Fourth Amendment, “in-
vestigators executing a warrant can look anywhere in the place to be 
searched where evidence described in the warrant might conceivably 
be located.  In traditional investigations for physical evidence, this 
rule means that officers cannot look in places smaller than the evi-
dence they wish to seize.”26 
It has been argued that electronic searches cannot be limited in 
the same way.  Electronic evidence is almost always located anywhere 
on a computer in files that appear identical.  Further, those files are 
often “mislabeled, hidden, or otherwise stored in a way that the inves-
tigator can never rule out a particular part of the hard drive ex 
ante.”27  Within that massive amount of data, it is often difficult for of-
 
 22 See, e.g., Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) (“The Warrant Clause of the Fourth 
Amendment categorically prohibits the issuance of any warrant except one ‘particularly 
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.’”). 
 23 Regensburger, supra note 21, at 1156 (quoting United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 75 
(2d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 24 Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 17, at 299. 
 25 See id. at 302 (“In physical space, the particularity requirement limits the scope of a search 
to a place on the order of a house or apartment.  Limiting the space to be searched serves 
as a key limitation on the scope of the search.”); see also Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 
86 (“The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general 
searches.  By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for 
which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be 
carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-
ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.”). 
 26 Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 17, at 304. 
 27 Id.  Courts have often recognized the dangers in limiting an officer’s ability to freely 
search a computer.  See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“‘Computer records are extremely susceptible to tampering, hiding, or destruction, 
whether deliberate or inadvertent.’  Images can be hidden in all manner of files, even 
word processing documents and spreadsheets.  Criminals will do all they can to conceal 
contraband, including the simple expedient of changing the names and extensions of 
files to disguise their content from the casual observer.” (internal citation omitted)). 
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ficers to pinpoint the location of the responsive digital evidence.  
Evidence may be contained in files on a hard drive of a computer and 
may also be hidden from view by encryption “or other security me-
thods.”28  As a result, it is often necessary to search the entire comput-
er to find the responsive information. 
Courts have taken vastly different approaches in dealing with 
complex computer searches.  Some courts have found the warrant 
particularity requirement satisfied even though the warrant only gen-
erally describes the computer or media to be searched.29  Because of a 
computer’s massive storage capacity, other courts “have been loath to 
authorize broad searches which allow agents seeming unfettered dis-
cretion in deciding what files to seize and how they should be 
searched.”30  Indeed, a warrant simply limiting a search to a computer 
may be insufficient to restrict the scope of a search:  five years ago, 
the hard drive “on a typical new home computer stored at least forty 
gigabytes of information, roughly equivalent to twenty million pages 
of text or about half the information stored in the books located on 
one floor of a typical academic library.”31  Further, “limiting a search 
to a particular computer is something like limiting a search to a city 
block; ten years from now, it will be more like limiting a search to the 
entire city.”32 
 
 28 Regensburger, supra note 21, at 1156. 
 29 United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742, 746–47 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Both warrants described the 
computer equipment itself in generic terms and subjected it to blanket seizure.  However, 
this type of generic classification is acceptable ‘when a more precise description is not 
possible,’ and in this case no more specific description of the computer equipment 
sought was possible.  The government knew Lacy had downloaded computerized visual 
depictions of child pornography, but did not know whether the images were stored on 
the hard drive or on one or more of his many computer disks.  In the affidavit supporting 
the search warrant application, a Customs agent explained there was no way to specify 
what hardware and software had to be seized to retrieve the images accurately.” (quoting 
United States v. Cardwell, 680 F.2d 75, 78 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted)). 
 30 Regensburger, supra note 21, at 1157; see, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1276 
(10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the search of a computer containing pornographic image 
files went beyond the scope of a warrant permitting the search of a computer for evi-
dence of drug trafficking). 
 31 Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 17, at 302; see also Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of 
Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 75, 105 (1994) (“Since electronic sto-
rage is likely to contain a greater quantity and variety of information than any previous 
storage method, computers make tempting targets in searches for incriminating informa-
tion.  However, this very quantity and variety of information increases the likelihood that 
highly personal information, irrelevant to the subject of the lawful investigation, will also 
be searched or seized.”). 
 32 Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 17, at 303. 
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An alternative approach to computer searches was advocated by 
Raphael Winick in 1994.33  He recognized the potential dangers in 
applying a traditional Fourth Amendment analysis to computers that 
can store “massive quantities” of data.34  His approach was comprised 
of two steps.  First, the officer must seek permission to remove a 
computer from the premises.35  Once that permission is granted, the 
officers must get a second warrant that details precisely what types of 
files are to be searched and exactly how the files will be searched.36  
Winick also proposed a procedure to deal with intermingled docu-
ments in computer searches: 
“[W]here officers come across relevant documents so intermingled with 
irrelevant documents that they cannot feasibly be sorted at the site, the 
officers may seal or hold the documents pending approval by a magi-
strate of the conditions and limitations on a further search through the 
documents.  If the officers know prior to the search that transporting 
large quantities of documents or hardware is likely, they can apply to the 
magistrate issuing the warrant for permission to remove such material; 
permission should be granted only when on-site sorting of relevant and 
irrelevant material is infeasible and no other practical alternative ex-
ists.”37 
Orin Kerr has rejected Winick’s approach in favor of one that 
proposes that “forensic examiners, not magistrates, are the persons 
who are best able to dictate the search parameters.”38  Without first 
looking at the files on a hard drive, Kerr argued, it is practically im-
possible to know what a particular search requires.  “The ability to 
target information described in a warrant is highly contingent on a 
number of factors that are difficult or even impossible to predict ex 
ante.”39  Kerr further noted that because of these difficulties, “magi-
strate judges are poorly equipped to evaluate whether a particular 
search protocol is the fastest and most targeted way of locating evi-
dence stored on a hard drive.”40 
 
 33 Winick, supra note 31. 
 34 Id. at 89. 
 35 Id. at 107; see also Regensberger, supra note 21, at 1158 (stating that the first prong of Wi-
nick’s test “requires that officers apply for permission to remove a computer and storage 
media from the premises”). 
 36 Winick, supra note 31, at 108. 
 37 Id. at 105–06. 
 38 Regensberger, supra note 21, at 1161; see also Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 17, at 
572 (arguing that an ex ante strategy “wrongly assumes that prosecutors and magistrate 
judges have the knowledge needed to articulate search strategies before the search be-
gins”). 
 39 Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 17, at 575. 
 40 Id. 
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B. The Perils of the Plain View Doctrine and Computer Searches 
The plain view exception to the warrant requirement, when ap-
plied to computer files, further highlights the difficulty in applying 
traditional Fourth Amendment principles to digital media.  The plain 
view doctrine is only satisfied when, among other things, an officer 
conducts a narrowly tailored search that is reasonably related to the 
target of the search.  “Though the plain view doctrine increases the 
amount of evidence an officer can possibly seize, it also limits the 
manner in which the police conduct searches.”41  In a physical search, 
warrants limit officers to physical places, such as rooms and buildings.  
In computer searches, those physical limitations do not exist, making 
it difficult, if not impossible, to narrowly tailor a search.  For example, 
“[t]hough a warrant may describe a certain type of file, [such as] a 
text file, it is difficult to conduct a search only of text files.”42  Seizing 
a computer for a few responsive files is comparable to seizing an en-
tire house and carting off its contents “to mine them for evidence of 
crime, which the Fourth Amendment prohibits.”43  If the entire con-
tents of a computer may be searched and seized, without limitation, it 
is distinctly possible that an officer may use the plain view doctrine to 
justify the seizure of any evidence that falls outside the scope of the 
warrant. 
Additionally, in order for evidence to be admitted under the plain 
view doctrine, the incriminating nature of that evidence must be im-
mediately apparent and in plain view of the investigators.  With com-
puter searches “[o]fficers neither stand within the confines of the 
computer nor rely on their ambient vision to immediately identify 
elements of the digital landscape.”44  Rather, officers work with the 
contents of a computer in a very abstract way.  “A user must execute a 
file to reveal its hidden contents.  Accordingly, a directory is not ob-
viously incriminating until it is investigated.”45  Under the plain view 
doctrine, officers may be able to seize any of these files.46 
The potential freedom of officers to seize electronic information 
outside the scope of a warrant through the plain view doctrine is 
troublesome, particularly when it is considered that inadvertence is 
no longer a requirement of that doctrine.  The justifications for eli-
 
 41 Andrew Vahid Moshirnia, Separating Hard Fact from Hard Drive:  A Solution for Plain View 
Doctrine in the Digital Domain, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 609, 612 (2010). 
 42 Id. at 612–13. 
 43 Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 17, at 300. 
 44 Moshirnia, supra note 41, at 612. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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minating the inadvertence requirement in Horton v. California are no 
longer valid in the context of computer searches.47  Since narrowly 
tailoring a computer search is difficult, the check against general 
warrants as described in Horton may not exist.48  Additionally, the par-
ticularity requirement in the Fourth Amendment—that no warrant 
shall issue unless it “particularly describ[es] the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized”—may be difficult to enforce 
in the context of computer searches and will not protect against gen-
eral searches, as Horton said it would.49  Courts and commentators 
have understandably struggled to apply the plain view doctrine in an 
electronic context.50  While some courts have abandoned plain view, 
others have attempted to adapt the doctrine to fit digital searches.51 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH TO THE PLAIN VIEW 
DOCTRINE AND COMPUTER SEARCHES BEFORE COMPREHENSIVE DRUG 
TESTING, INC. 
Because the Ninth Circuit has taken the most drastic stance in re-
gulating computer searches, this comment focuses on the line of de-
cisions that arrived at the current state of the law in that jurisdiction.  
However, when considering alternative approaches, the view of other 
circuits will be discussed.52  Until the groundbreaking en banc deci-
sion in U.S. v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. in August 2009, the 
Ninth Circuit had often rejected the use of strict search protocols and 
contemplated the use of the plain view exception to the warrant re-
quirement during computer searches.  Prior to Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc., the Ninth Circuit generally refused to apply a unique 
approach to computer searches and instead used a traditional closed 
container analysis.  Over the past several years (and up until the Com-
 
 47 See supra Part I. 
 48 Id. 
 49 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 50 Orin Kerr, among other commentators, is an advocate of “rethink[ing] the plain view 
exception in the context of digital evidence.”  See Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 17, 
at 576–77 (“The dynamics of computer searches upset the basic assumptions underlying 
the plain view doctrine.  More and more evidence comes into plain view, and the particu-
larity requirement no longer functions effectively as a check on dragnet searches.  In this 
new environment, a tightening of the plain view doctrine may be necessary to ensure that 
computer warrants that are narrow in theory do not become broad in practice.”).   
 51 Moshirnia, supra note 41, at 613 (“Because the plain view doctrine is discordant with the 
digital domain, courts have struggled to apply their prior physical jurisprudence to new 
technologies.  While some courts have become so frustrated that they have effectively 
abandoned plain view in the electronic context, other courts have adopted tortured and 
ultimately unsatisfactory frameworks for digital searches.”). 
 52 See infra Part V. 
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prehensive Drug Testing, Inc. decision), the court often declined to 
suppress evidence relating to a second crime implicating the defen-
dant when that evidence was found in plain view during an officer’s 
warranted search of the defendant’s computer. 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit in U.S. v. Adjani declined to restrict the 
government’s e-mail search to specific search terms or e-mail ad-
dresses.  Because file names can easily be altered or disguised, the 
government should “not be required to trust the suspect’s self-
labeling when executing a warrant.”53  The court further stated that 
“[t]here is no rule . . . that evidence turned up while officers are 
rightfully searching a location under a properly issued warrant must 
be excluded simply because the evidence found may support charges 
for a related crime (or against a suspect) not expressly contemplated 
in the warrant.”54  A warrant was issued to obtain evidence of an ex-
tortion plot of a co-defendant.  The defendant in that case argued 
that the e-mails seized after a search of her computer were obtained 
illegally, since the e-mails fell outside the scope of the warrant.  The 
court rejected the defendant’s claim that the e-mails seized were out-
side the scope of the warrant “because they implicated her in the 
crime and supported a charge of conspiracy to commit extortion (a 
crime not specifically mentioned in the warrant).”55 
In U.S. v. Wong, the Ninth Circuit allowed child pornography 
found on the defendant’s computer to be admitted as evidence.56  In 
that case, the search warrant specified that murder evidence could be 
found on the defendant’s computer in “plain text, special text, and 
graphics files.”57  The court found that since the officers were lawfully 
searching the computer for “evidence of murder in the graphics files 
[] that they had legitimately accessed and where the incriminating 
child pornography was located, the evidence was properly admitted 
under the plain view doctrine.”58 
In U.S v. Giberson, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court 
properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of child 
pornography found on a copied computer hard drive by an officer 
during a search for evidence of the production of false identification 
(I.D.) cards, done pursuant to a valid warrant.59  The court declined 
 
 53 United States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 54 Id. at 1151. 
 55 Id. 
 56 United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 839 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 57 Id. at 838. 
 58 Id. 
 59 United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 889–90 (9th Cir. 2008). 
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to impose heightened protections in computer searches as a result of 
a computer’s ability to store potentially intermingled information.60  
The court wrote that “[i]t would be unreasonable to require the gov-
ernment to limit its search to directories called, for example, ‘Fake 
I.D. Documents.’”61 
Finally, discussion of the Ninth Circuit’s decisions on the plain 
view doctrine and computer searches mandates mention of United 
States v. Tamura, although that case dealt with intermingled paper 
documents.62  In 1982, the court in Tamura broke with the closed 
container analysis and “objected to the ‘wholesale seizure’ of entire 
filing cabinets of records without any efforts to limit the seizure of 
unrelated material.”63  The government’s warrant only authorized sei-
zure of three types of records from the defendant’s office.64  Because 
those documents were so intermingled with other documents outside 
of those three categories and could not be separated without signifi-
cant time and effort, the government seized all of the defendant’s 
records in their entirety.65  The court noted that as a general rule, on-
ly items specified in the warrant may be seized.66  But, they recognized 
the plain view doctrine to the warrant requirement as it existed be-
fore Horton v. California and the abrogation of the inadvertence re-
quirement as an exception.67  The rule that only items specified in a 
search warrant may be seized “is subject to an exception which per-
mits the seizure of contraband or other incriminating evidence found 
inadvertently during the execution of a search warrant.”68 
The court adopted the first prong of Winick’s test in an effort to 
curb the “wholesale seizure for later detailed examination of records 
not described in a warrant.”69  The court found that in the rare in-
stances where documents are so intermingled that they cannot be se-
parated onsite, “the Government and law enforcement officials gen-
erally can avoid violating [F]ourth [A]mendment rights by sealing 
and holding the documents pending approval by a magistrate of a 
 
 60 Id. at 890. 
 61 Id. 
 62 United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 594–95 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 63 Regensburger, supra note 21, at 1159. 
 64 Tamura, 694 F.2d at 594. 
 65 Id. at 595. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See supra Part I. 
 68 Tamura, 694 F.2d at 595 n.1.  
 69 Id. (emphasis in original). 
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further search.”70  In this case, the court sought to temper the possi-
bility of wholesale removal of intermingled documents by requiring 
oversight of a “neutral, detached magistrate.”71  Accordingly, the 
court found that seizure of documents not covered by the search war-
rant was unreasonable.72 
In sum, prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Comprehensive Drug 
Testing, Inc., the court was willing to reject a special approach to 
computer searches by upholding the seizure of electronic evidence in 
plain view that was not covered by the government’s initial search 
warrant.  Despite this trend, cases dealing with intermingled paper 
documents, such as Tamura, suggested that there may be limits to 
what the government could seize. 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S EN BANC DECISION IN COMPREHENSIVE 
DRUG TESTING, INC. 
In August of 2009, U.S. v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., (herei-
nafter CDT) eliminated the plain view doctrine and imposed a host of 
other burdensome requirements on investigators, while citing practi-
cally no precedent or reasoning for its decision. 
This case has a long history and complicated factual record.  Be-
ginning in August, 2002, the federal government instituted an inves-
tigation into the Bay Area Lab Cooperative (BALCO), which was sus-
pected of providing steroids to professional baseball players.73  That 
same year, Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT) administered a 
suspicionless drug testing program at the behest of Major League 
Baseball.74  The results of the tests were to remain “anonymous and 
confidential.”75  CDT kept a list of players and their respective re-
sults.76  During the BALCO investigation, the federal government dis-
covered ten players who had tested positive for steroid use in the 
CDT program.77  As a result, the government obtained a search war-
rant in the Central District of California, “authorizing the search of 
 
 70 Id. at 595–96; see also Regensburger, supra note 21, at 1159 (“The first prong of Winick’s 
test is essentially an adoption of the intermingled document doctrine, first espoused in 
United States v. Tamura.”). 
 71 Tamura, 694 F.2d at 596. 
 72 Id. 
 73 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1089 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 74 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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CDT’s facilities in Long Beach.”78  The warrant was limited to those 
ten players.79 
The magistrate judge who issued the search warrant granted the 
government broad authority to seize practically any computer, data 
storage device, log, or related material found at CDT’s facility, and to 
examine all data contained in that equipment.80  At the same time, 
the magistrate also placed limits on the government’s authority, re-
quiring the government to “examine the computer equipment and 
storage devices at CDT to determine whether information pertaining 
to the ten identified players c[ould] be searched on-site in a reasona-
ble amount of time.”81  The warrant also contained “restrictions on 
how the seized data were to be handled,” and required that the initial 
data review and segregation be conducted by computer personnel 
other than the investigating case agents.82  These computer personnel 
were responsible for ensuring the integrity of the search and prevent-
ing over-seizure, outside the warrant’s scope.83 
Instead of following the magistrate’s orders, the district court in 
the Central District of California found that “[o]nce the items were 
seized, the requirement of the Warrant that any seized items not cov-
ered by the warrant be first screened and segregated by computer 
personnel was completely ignored.”84  The government copied the 
entire “Tracey Directory” from CDT’s directory, which contained “in-
formation and test results involving hundreds of other baseball play-
ers and athletes engaged in other professional sports.”85  The case 
agent reviewed the entire directory himself and used information 
gleaned from that directory to obtain subsequent search warrants in 
Northern and Southern California, as well as Nevada.86 
The district court found that the government had “failed to comp-
ly with the procedures specified in the warrant, and on that basis and 
others, ordered the property returned.”87  In August, 2009, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, found that the government 
 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 995. 
 81 Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82 Id. at 995–96. 
 83 Id. at 996. 
 84 Id. (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). 
 85 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86 Id. at 997. 
 87 Id. at 993–94. 
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failed to file a timely appeal and upheld the district court’s ruling 
based on the preclusive effect of the order.88 
Despite the conclusive nature of these findings, the en banc panel 
decided to dispose of the government’s arguments and implement a 
framework of its own.  The government argued that it was not re-
quired to return the data it found concerning players other than the 
ten mentioned in the warrant since that evidence was “in plain view” 
in the Tracey Directory.89  Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, 
“in a withering opinion for the 9-2 majority, accused investigators of 
trampling the privacy rights and reputations of hundreds of people 
who had done nothing to alert the authorities’ suspicion.”90  The 
court rejected the government’s plain view argument as “too clever by 
half,” stating that the danger of accepting it would be to turn a “li-
mited search for particular information into a general search,” and 
would be in direct contravention of Ninth Circuit precedent in Tamu-
ra.91  Everything the government wanted to seize would, “under this 
theory, automatically come into plain view.”92  If the court accepted 
the government’s plain view argument, it would be condoning the 
“fishing” expeditions expressly prohibited by Tamura.93 
The Ninth Circuit did not end its discussion there.  Instead, focus-
ing on the supreme importance of preserving the privacy of inter-
mingled electronic materials, it chose to establish firm guidelines, 
unsupported by any authority94 that must be followed by magistrate 
judges when dealing with electronic data.  Those guidelines, which 
 
 88 Id. at 997. 
 89 Id. 
 90 See Shane Harris, Cuffing Digital Detectives, NAT’L J., Dec. 19, 2009, at 52 (“Kozinski’s opi-
nion amounts to a concise and forceful description of the unique threats to Fourth 
Amendment prohibitions on unlawful searches and seizures in the Information Age.”); see 
also Orin Kerr, Cuffing Digital Detectives, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 20, 2009, 1:08 
AM), http://volokh.com/2009/12/20/cuffing-digital-detectives/ (acknowledging the 
National Journal Magazine article). 
 91 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d at 998; see also United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 
591, 597 (9th Cir. 1982) (“Under the circumstances of the present case, where the Gov-
ernment’s wholesale seizures were motivated by considerations of practicality rather than 
by a desire to engage in indiscriminate ‘fishing,’ we cannot say, although we find it a close 
case, that the officers so abused the warrant’s authority that the otherwise valid warrant 
was transformed into a general one, thereby requiring all fruits to be suppressed.”). 
 92 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d at 998. 
 93 Tamura, 694 F.2d at 597. 
 94 See Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit Considers Super-En-Banc for Comprehensive Drug Testing, THE 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 5, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://volokh.com/2009/11/05/ninth-
circuit-considers-super-en-banc-for-comprehensive-drug-testing/ [hereinafter, Kerr, Ninth 
Circuit Considers Super-En-Banc] (noting that the guidelines were announced “without any 
apparent authority or even a case or controversy”). 
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combined both Winick’s and Kerr’s approaches to computer 
searches, stated that: 
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance upon 
the plain view doctrine in digital evidences cases. 
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by specialized per-
sonnel or an independent third party.  If the segregation is to be done by 
government computer personnel, it must agree in the warrant applica-
tion that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any 
information other than that which is the target of the warrant. 
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction 
of information as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other 
judicial fora. 
4. The government’s search protocol must be designed to uncover only 
the information for which it has probable cause, and only that informa-
tion may be examined by the case agents. 
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess 
it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed 
about when it has done so and what it has kept.95 
In response to this decision, the Department of Justice petitioned 
for “super en banc” rehearing.96  On November 4, 2009, the Ninth 
Circuit entered an order requesting that the parties file briefs ad-
dressing whether this case should be reheard, yet again, by the 
court—this time by all thirty two judges on the Ninth Circuit.97  The 
rationale for this decision can be summed up by the following:  “in 
the unlikely event that six judges might command a majority of an 
eleven-judge en banc court and express a view inconsistent with the 
views of the other twenty one active judges on the court, the circuit 
rules provide for review by the full court upon the request of any 
 
 95 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d at 1006 (internal citations omitted). 
 96 See Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit Considers Super-En-Banc, supra note 94 (“[T]he Ninth Circuit 
entered an order [on November 4th, 2009] addressed to the parties in the case asking 
them to brief whether the case should be reheard by the full en banc court . . . .”).  As of 
August 16, 2010, the Ninth Circuit had not ruled on whether to conduct an en banc re-
hearing.  Orin Kerr, Whatever Happened to the Request for Super-En-Banc Rehearing in CDT?, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Aug. 16, 2010, 6:15 PM), http://volokh.com/
2010/08/16/whatever-happened-to-the-request-for-super-en-banc-rehearing-in-cdt/ [he-
reinafter Kerr, Whatever Happened]. 
 97 Order No. 05-10067, United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 579 F.3d 989 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (D.C. No. MISC-04-234-SI) (Nov. 4, 2009); see also Orin Kerr, Ninth Circuit Con-
siders Super En Banc (“The Ninth Circuit has so many active judges that its en banc panels 
consist of only about a third of its active judges.”).  Thus, the first en banc hearing con-
sisted of only 11 judges. 
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judge.”98  Notably, this has never occurred since the limited en banc 
rule was adopted by the court in 1980.99 
On November 23, 2009, the Department of Justice, led by then So-
licitor General Elena Kagan, filed its Brief in Support of Rehearing 
en banc by the full court.100  The Justice Department primarily took 
issue with the new guidelines promulgated by the Ninth Circuit, stat-
ing that “computer searches have ground to a complete halt” in many 
jurisdictions as a result of the court’s decision.101  The brief further 
argued that “[t]he en banc panel stepped outside the proper role of 
an Article III court when it set forth detailed protocols that purport 
to bind, and that are being understood as binding, magistrate and 
district judges in future cases.”102  The Justice Department argued that 
the seminal issues should be resolved in actual cases involving com-
puter searches, not through “guidance” that “magistrate judges must 
be vigilant in observing.”103 
The Justice Department warned of the potentially damaging ef-
fects CDT’s strict protocols could have on the furtherance of effective 
investigations of electronic data.  The burden of following the proce-
dures outlined in that decision would largely fall on the federal au-
thorities who are responsible for conducting criminal investigations 
and could lead to drastically increased investigatory costs.104  The ef-
fects might be passed on to state authorities, who would be forced to 
effectuate what federal authorities could not, since the state police 
would be unconstrained by the holding in CDT and thus more easily 
able to conduct computer searches.105  Further, one commentator ob-
 
 98 Statement of Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts 
Regarding H.R. 2723 (Oct. 21, 2003). 
 99 Id. 
100 Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court at 1, Unit-
ed States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 05-
10067, 05-15006, 05-55354). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 2. 
103 Id. 
104 See id. at 16.; Rob Lee, Sweeping 9th Circuit Decision Regarding Law Enforcement Officer Com-
puter Forensics, SANS COMPUTER FORENSICS AND E-DISCOVERY WITH ROB LEE (Aug. 27, 2009, 
3:10 AM), http://blogs.sans.org/computer-forensics/2009/08/27/sweeping-9th-circuit-
decision-regarding-law-enforcement-officer-computer-forensics/ (arguing that increased 
costs could come in the form of governmental agencies being forced to expand their per-
sonnel to include computer specialists, or to hire independent third parties at a substan-
tial cost); see also United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1013 
(9th Cir. 2009) (Callahan, J., dissenting) (noting that these cost implications could also 
have a large effect on the ability of smaller police departments to do their jobs). 
105 Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court at 6, Unit-
ed States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 05-
10067, 05-15006, 05-55354). 
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served that “[i]f law enforcement officials had to stop their investiga-
tion and seek judicial oversight every time they seized a computer, 
law enforcement would grind to a halt in the United States . . . . [This 
would be like requiring] . . . law enforcement officials to impound 
the contents of a desk or a car before being allowed to search it.”106 
The government also noted that an FBI forensic analyst in the Dis-
trict of Arizona had expressed concern that he would “need many 
months to learn a complex national security case before attempting 
to segregate responsive and non-responsive data on a seized comput-
er,” as required by the procedures in CDT.107  That decision’s proto-
cols could also lead to missed opportunities to discover evidence.  In 
the same rehearing brief, the Justice Department cited a case in the 
Western District of Washington where federal agents who were inves-
tigating a potential child rape case did not obtain a warrant to search 
the defendant’s computer, despite evidence of incriminating images, 
“because of concerns that any evidence discovered about other po-
tential victims could not be disclosed by the filter team.”108 
IV. NINTH CIRCUIT’S AMENDED COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC. 
PER CURIAM OPINION 
On September 13, 2010, almost a year after the Department of 
Justice petitioned for rehearing, the Ninth Circuit issued a new opi-
nion denying an en banc rehearing, but amending its original opi-
nion to remove the challenged guidelines from the majority opi-
nion.109  The amended decision did not change the outcome of the 
case:  the court found, once again, that the government had ignored 
the dictates of the warrant and Tamura, and the decision to force 
them to return the test results for the baseball players not covered by 
 
106 Regensburger, supra note 21, at 1204. 
107 Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court at 6, Unit-
ed States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 05-
10067, 05-15006, 05-55354). 
108 Id. at 6–7. 
109 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-11067, 05-15006, 05-
55354, 2010 WL 352947 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2010) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (providing fu-
ture guidance on how to deal with electronically stored data searches); Orin Kerr, Ninth 
Circuit Balks in BALCO Case:  Denying Super En banc in United States v. Comprehensive 
Drug Testing but Amending Opinion to Remove Challenged Section, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(Sept. 13, 2010, 2:04 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/09/13/ninth-circuit-balks-in-balco-
case-denying-super-en-banc-in-united-states-v-comprehensive-drug-testing-but-amending-
opinion-to-remove-challenged-section/ [hereinafter Kerr, Ninth Circuit Balks in BALCO 
Case] (“[I]t seems that the weird mandatory rules part of Judge Kozinski’s initial en banc 
majority opinion in CDT is now just part of a Kozinski concurrence to what has been rela-
beled a per curiam majority opinion.”). 
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the warrant was upheld.110  The court acknowledged that the govern-
ment likely attempted to comply with Tamura by seeking “advance au-
thorization for sorting and segregating the seized materials off-site” 
but “[o]nce the items were seized, the requirement of the Warrant 
that any seized items not covered by the warrant be first screened and 
segregated by computer personnel was completely ignored.”111  The 
court reiterated the challenges faced by modern law enforcement in 
the wake of advancing technology.112  “This pressing need of law en-
forcement for broad authorization to examine electronic records,” 
the court noted, “creates a serious risk that every warrant for elec-
tronic information will become, in effect, a general warrant, render-
ing the Fourth Amendment irrelevant.”113  In cases involving inter-
mingled electronic data, the court made it clear that the approach in 
Tamura is to govern.114  Finally, the court closed the door to any fu-
ture petitions in this case, stating that “[t]he revised opinion filed 
concurrently herewith shall constitute the final action of the court.”115 
Judge Kozinski’s guidance, including the court’s insistence “that 
the government waive reliance upon the plain view doctrine in digital 
evidence cases,”116 largely remained unchanged, but that guidance 
lost the support of a majority of the Ninth Circuit and was relegated 
to the concurrence in this new opinion.117  Consequently, the sug-
gested guidelines are no longer Ninth Circuit law.  Kozinski’s concur-
rence now acknowledges the non-binding nature of these guidelines, 
but still stresses their importance and relevance, noting that “the 
guidance . . . offers the government a safe harbor . . . . District and 
magistrate judges must exercise their independent judgment in every 
case, but heeding this guidance will significantly increase the likelih-
 
110 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 2010 WL 3529247, at *6 (“We can and do uphold these 
findings based on the preclusive effect of the Cooper and Illston Orders.”). 
111 Id. at *5 (alteration in original). 
112 Id. at *12 (“Law enforcement today thus has a far more difficult, exacting and sensitive 
task in pursuing evidence of criminal activities than even in the relatively recent past.”). 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at *13 (“Tamura has provided a workable framework for almost three decades, and 
might well have sufficed in this case had its teachings been followed.  We have updated 
Tamura to apply to the daunting realities of electronic searches.”). 
115 Id. at *1. 
116 Id. at *16. 
117 Kozinski’s concurrence is joined by four other judges—Judges Andrew Kleinfeld, William 
Fletcher, Richard Paez, and Milan Smith, Jr.  His guidelines lost the support of Judges 
Marsha Berzon, Susan Graber, and Kim McLane Wardlaw.  See Ginny LaRoe, Steroids in 
Baseball:  9th Circuit Backtracks on Electronic Search Rules, LAW.COM (Sept. 14, 2010), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202472007634 (explaining that 
the Ninth Circuit backtracked from the privacy guidelines issued in the original en banc 
opinion). 
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ood that the searches and seizures of electronic storage . . . will 
be . . . lawful.”118  There can be no doubt that the government’s ac-
tions, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, will continue to be shaped 
and influenced by Kozinski’s guidelines, especially with the assurance 
that complying with them will provide the government with a “safe 
harbor.” 
A. Problems with Judge Kozinski’s Electronic Search Guidelines 
A lengthy portion of this Comment in an earlier draft form was 
dedicated to how and why Judge Kozinski’s guidelines should be re-
moved from the majority’s decision.  Though these guidelines are no 
longer Ninth Circuit law, they remain problematic and, more impor-
tantly, unconstitutional.  While the court did not give any explanation 
for its decision to remove the guidelines from the per curiam opinion, 
the decision was nevertheless correct.  The guidelines were both 
beyond the scope of Article III and in direct contravention to Su-
preme Court precedent applying the plain view doctrine to warranted 
searches. 
i. Guidelines Were Beyond the Scope of Article III 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution vests the federal courts with 
“judicial [p]ower” and grants the courts jurisdiction to exercise it in 
various “cases” and “controversies.”119  As the Justice Department 
points out in its brief for rehearing, the controversial procedures set 
forth by Judge Kozinski go far beyond the resolution of any “case” or 
“controversy.”120  The detailed guidance set forth by the Ninth Circuit 
was unnecessary to the resolution of the case at hand.  In the en banc 
CDT opinion, the court noted the “preclusive effect” of the lower 
court orders, but went on with its procedural recommendations be-
cause “the matter is important, and to avoid any quibble about the 
proper scope of preclusion.”121  Nevertheless, “[i]n issuing this wide-
ranging and detailed ‘guidance’ about subjects that were unnecessary 
 
118 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 2010 WL 3529247, at *14. 
119 U.S. CONST. art. III (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one su-
preme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”). 
120 Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court at 4, Unit-
ed States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 05-
10067, 05-15006, 05-55354). (“[T]he en banc panel reached well beyond the issues before 
it and purported to establish binding new procedures . . . .”). 
121 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 997 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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to resolve the particular cases before it, the en banc panel departed 
from the proper role of an Article III court.”122 
Rather than resolving a particular “case” or “controversy,” as re-
quired by Article III, the Ninth Circuit in its original en banc opinion 
issued an advisory opinion.  The Supreme Court “has used the term 
‘advisory opinion’ to embrace . . . ‘[a]ny opinion, or portion thereof, 
not truly necessary to the disposition of the case at bar (that is, dic-
ta)’.”123  The prohibition against advisory opinions has been deemed 
“the oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciabil-
ity.”124  According to Preiser v. Newkirk, “a federal court has neither the 
power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that can-
not affect the rights of litigants in the case before them,” yet, by is-
suing the detailed guidelines for all future computer searches, this is 
precisely what the Ninth Circuit had done.125  To be sure, the guide-
lines proposed by the Ninth Circuit “would ordinarily be handled 
through the legislative process, rather than through a heavy-handed 
judicial edict,” such as this one.126 
ii. Guidelines Departed From Precedent Allowing Warrantless Searches of 
Objects in Plain View 
The five guidelines place a heavy burden on officers, police de-
partments, and the federal government that go far beyond the textual 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  The plain view exception 
to the warrant requirement, as described by the Supreme Court, ap-
plies when officers “have a warrant to search a given area for specified 
objects, and in the course of the search come across some other ar-
ticle of incriminating character.”127  While there are valid concerns 
regarding the dangers of the plain view doctrine’s applicability to 
computer searches128 and turning particularized search warrants into 
 
122 Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court at 4–5, 
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 
05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354). 
123 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 56 (6th ed. 
2009) (quoting Even Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability:  The Example of Mootness, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 603, 644–45 (1992)). 
124 Charles Alan Wright & Mary Kay Kane, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 65 (6th ed. 2002). 
125 Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court at 5, Unit-
ed States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 05-
10067, 05-15006, 05-55354). 
126 Thomas R. Eddlem, Fourth Amendment Under Siege Again, NEW AMERICAN, Nov. 28, 2009, at 
2. 
127 Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990). 
128 See supra Part I. 
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general search warrants, the wholesale elimination of the plain view 
doctrine has no basis in the law and is in direct contradiction to Su-
preme Court precedent allowing the use of the plain view doctrine in 
the context of warranted searches. 
The Ninth Circuit effected a wholesale elimination of the doctrine 
with respect to computer searches without providing any manner of 
legal support for its ruling.  The dissent in the per curiam opinion 
noted “the suggested protocols essentially jettison the plain view doc-
trine in digital evidence cases . . . . This is put forth without explain-
ing why the Supreme Court’s case law or our case law dictates or even 
suggests that the plain view doctrine should be entirely abandoned in 
digital evidence cases.”129 
Moreover, not only is the elimination of the plain view doctrine in 
contradiction to Supreme Court precedent, it also sidesteps Ninth 
Circuit precedent.  As previously noted, the Ninth Circuit in United 
States v. Adjani, United States v. Giberson and United States v. Wong, re-
fused to suppress evidence found in plain view during the course of a 
valid computer search.130 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO ELIMINATING THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 
Judge Kozinski calls for the total elimination of the plain view doc-
trine during computer searches.  This approach is far too drastic and 
far-reaching—and, more importantly, flies in the face of important 
constitutional principles.  The Ninth Circuit undoubtedly acknowl-
edged this by amending its opinion in CDT.  While Judge Kozinski’s 
approach remained part of the majority opinion in CDT, several oth-
er circuits, including the Fourth and the Seventh, expressly failed to 
follow it.131  Those circuits—as well as the Tenth Circuit—
demonstrate that the plain view doctrine can and should be applied 
to computer searches. 
 
129 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354, 
2010 WL 352947 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2010), at *20. 
130 See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989, 1011 (9th Cir. 
2009); United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2008) (refusing to suppress 
evidence of child pornography found in a search for false identification card); United 
States v. Adjani, 452 F.3d 1140, 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (rejecting the defendant’s claim that 
emails seized were outside the scope of the warrant because they implicated her in 
another crime not covered by the search warrant); United States v. Wong, 334 F.3d 831, 
833 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the plain view doctrine to murder investigation case in the 
context of a computer search and the discovery of child pornography). 
131 See infra Part V.A-B. 
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A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach 
In the wake of the original en banc decision in CDT, several cir-
cuit courts had already expressed their reluctance to prohibit the use 
of the plain view doctrine.  For example, the Fourth Circuit in United 
States v. Williams used the closed container approach to computer 
searches to find that the seizure of images portraying child porno-
graphy was justified by the plain view exception to the warrant re-
quirement.132  The warrant authorized a search of the defendant’s 
computers for evidence relating to the state law crimes of making 
threats and computer harassment.133  During the course of the search 
of the defendant’s computer and accompanying electronic media, 
one of the officers encountered over one thousand images in 
“thumbnail view,” some of which were sexually explicit.134  The defen-
dant challenged the authority of the officers to seize these images 
under the warrant.135  The court reasoned that in order to properly 
conduct the search, the warrant implicitly “authorized officers to 
open each file on the computer and view its contents, at least cursori-
ly, to determine whether the file fell within the scope of the warrant’s 
authorization.”136  The court expressed concerns about the difficulties 
of computer searches—namely, that an effective computer search 
cannot be limited to reviewing files based on labeling, file name, or 
extension, which can be easily changed or hidden.137  According to 
the Fourth Circuit, “[o]nce it [was] accepted that a computer search 
must, by implication, authorize at least a cursory review of each file 
on the computer, then the criteria for applying the plain-view excep-
tion [were] readily satisfied.”138 
The conception of the plain view doctrine as articulated by the 
Fourth Circuit is equally as radical as the Ninth Circuit’s “safe harbor” 
 
132 United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010) (“And so, in this case, any 
child pornography viewed on the computer or electronic media may be seized under the 
plain-view exception.”). 
133 Id. at 521. 
134 Id. at 516. 
135 Id. at 516, n.2. 
136 Id. at 521. 
137 Id. at 522 (“To be effective, such a search could not be limited to reviewing only the files’ 
designation or labeling, because the designation or labeling of files on a computer can 
easily be manipulated to hide their substance.”). 
138 Id.  The Williams court rejected the defendant’s argument that the images must have 
been found by the officers inadvertently in order to satisfy the plain view doctrine.  Id. at 
522–23 (“This argument, however, cannot stand against the principle. . . that the scope of 
a search conducted pursuant to a warrant is defined objectively by the terms of the warrant 
and the evidence sought, not by the subjective motivations of an officer.”); see also infra Part 
V.B. 
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elimination of the plain view doctrine, though at the opposite end of 
the spectrum.139  The Fourth Circuit, like the Ninth, offers a bright 
line rule:  “a warrant for one file is a warrant for all files on a de-
vice.”140  Courts should be hesitant to accept this approach to com-
puter searches.  Treating a hard drive, floppy disk, or computer as a 
“container,” as the Fourth Circuit did, is problematic for its broad-
reaching implications.  Essentially, this standard is analogous to treat-
ing a house as a “container,” by turning a warrant to obtain evidence 
for a particular crime into a blanket license to ransack an entire 
house in a search for that evidence.  Following this method, a warrant 
to search a computer for a specific crime is likely to become a general 
warrant—precisely what the Fourth Amendment was written to pro-
hibit.  This approach fails to protect a suspect’s privacy, or the privacy 
of others with intermingled data.141 
B.  A Better Approach in the Tenth and Seventh Circuits:  Restoring the 
Inadvertence Requirement to the Plain View Doctrine 
The Tenth and Seventh Circuits have developed an approach to 
computer searches that allows for the use of the plain view doctrine 
in limited circumstances.  The “virtual file” approach has been 
adopted by these two circuits.142  According to this approach:  
the relevant unit of search . . . is an individual file.  If you analogize a 
computer hard drive to a suitcase, each file is . . . its own zippered pocket 
in the suitcase.  A computer is like a container that stores thousands of 
individual containers in the form of discrete files.143   
In assessing the reasonableness of a seizure, it is first asked whether 
or not that individual file is outside the scope of the warrant.  If yes, it 
is then asked whether that file was discovered inadvertently. 
 
139 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-11067, 05-15006, 05-55354, 
2010 WL 352947 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2010), at *14 (“The guidance below offers the gov-
ernment a safe harbor, while protecting the people’s right to privacy and property in 
their papers and effects.”). 
140 Moshirnia, supra note 41, at 622. 
141 Id. at 622–23 (“[T]his approach could prove disastrous in the medical or corporate con-
texts because it is likely [to] allow searches of individuals’ private information that is only 
tenuously related to the criminal investigation.”). 
142 Kerr, Searches and Seizures, supra note 17, at 554 (describing three basic options for defin-
ing the zone of a computer search:  “the zone could be defined by the contents of a vir-
tual file, the physical storage device, or the exposed data.  If the zone is a device, then 
opening it searches all of its contents.  If the zone is a file, then that file is searched but 
the rest of the computer is unsearched.  Finally, if the zone is the exposed data itself, then 
exposure of data leaves all unexposed information unsearched”). 
143 Id. at 555. 
784 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
Rather than effecting a wholesale elimination of the plain view 
doctrine, the case law in the Tenth and Seventh Circuits provides a 
viable and less drastic alternative where “deliberate overreaching” by 
the police through the use of the plain view doctrine is prevented.144  
Evidence can be seized “outside the warrant only if it was uncovered 
pursuant to a good faith search for evidence described in the war-
rant.”145  In effect, these circuits created a more workable standard 
that ensures against morphing computer searches into grants of gen-
eral warrants by giving force to the historic “inadvertence require-
ment” of the plain view doctrine.146 
The Tenth Circuit first tackled the issue of what plain view means 
in the context of computer searches in 1999.147  In United States v. Ca-
rey, the Tenth Circuit found that a warrantless search of picture files 
on the defendant’s computer was not justified under the plain view 
doctrine.148  In that case, a police officer was searching a computer for 
evidence of drug trafficking, and “after noting several files with a sex-
ually suggestive name and with a ‘jpg’ file name extension, suggesting 
an image file, the officer began looking through the ‘jpg’ files.”149  In 
rejecting the plain view doctrine in this case, the court reasoned that 
“[t]he government’s argument [that] the files were in plain view 
[was] unavailing” because after opening one image file and finding 
evidence of child pornography, the officer continued to open subse-
quent image files, thereby obviating the inadvertence requirement.150 
The detective was aware that he was acting without judicial author-
ity (and outside of the scope of the warrant) when he abandoned his 
search for evidence of drug dealing and began looking through “jpg” 
files with “sexually suggestive titles.”151  Thus, the court suppressed the 
evidence since the detective could not have “inadvertently discov-
 
144 See Kerr, Digital Evidence, supra note 17, at 316–17 (citing United States v. Carey as an exam-
ple of a case that has narrowed the potential reach of the plain view doctrine in computer 
searches by “focusing on the investigator’s subjective intent”). 
145 Id. at 317. 
146 See discussion supra Part I.  The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged that the “inadvertence 
requirement” has not been mandated by the Fourth Amendment since Horton v. Califor-
nia.  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court continues to recognize the supreme importance 
and relevance of “inadvertence” in plain view searches.  See United States v. Carey, 172 
F.3d 1268, 1276–77 (10th Cir. 1999) (Baldock, J., concurring) (finding that child porno-
graphy discovered inadvertently while opening a defendant’s individual computer files 
could not be admitted into evidence as the result of a plain view search). 
147 See Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273. 
148 Id. 
149 Plain View Doctrine, 84 A.L.R. 58, § 13a (5th ed. 2000). 
150 Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273. 
151 Id. at 1270–71. 
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ered” the contents of the image files.152  In U.S. v. Walser, the Tenth 
Circuit distinguished the facts of Carey and reaffirmed the inadver-
tence requirement.153 
Most recently, the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Mann explicit-
ly refused to extend the protocols outlined in the en banc majority 
opinion in CDT to the facts of that case and adopted the Carey inad-
vertence requirement.154  The Mann court took a similar approach to 
the Tenth Circuit and asked “whether the agent knew or should have 
known that the file opened was outside the scope of the warrant.”155  
In that case, the government executed a warrant to search the defen-
dant’s computer for evidence of “voyeurism” and in the process of 
searching the files, the government encountered evidence of child 
pornography.156  The defendant moved to suppress the evidence of 
child pornography alleging that the evidence exceeded the scope of 
the warrant.157  The court noted that “[o]nce the [child pornography] 
files had been flagged” by the filtering software, the detective “knew 
(or should have known) that files in a database of known child por-
nography images would be outside the scope of the warrant.”158  The 
defendant urged the Seventh Circuit to adopt the Ninth Circuit’s ap-
proach in CDT in refusing to recognize that the child pornography 
images were found in plain view during the officer’s search of the 
 
152 Id. at 1273. 
153 United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 987 (10th Cir. 2001) (“In Carey, the officer was en-
gaged in a similar search for electronic records of drug dealing.  As in this case, the offic-
er in Carey inadvertently discovered the first image of child pornography while searching 
for documents relating to drug activity.  In Carey, however, after opening the first file, the 
officer’s conduct was the opposite of that which occurred in the present case. . . . Had 
Agent McFarland conducted a more extensive search than he did here by rummaging in 
folders and files beyond those he searched, he might well have exceeded the bounds of 
the warrant and the requirements of Casey [sic].  The fact of the matter, however, is that 
no such wholesale searching occurred here.  Agent McFarland showed restraint by re-
turning to the magistrate for a new warrant before commencing a new search for evi-
dence of child pornography.”) (citations omitted). 
154 United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that evidence of child por-
nography inadvertently discovered during a computer file search should not be sup-
pressed when the search was conducted within the scope of an existing warrant, and the 
search was not abandoned following discovery of the material in question). 
155 See Orin Kerr, Plain View for Computer Searches Generates Two Circuit Splits in Two Days:  Unit-
ed States v. Williams and United States v. Mann THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2010, 
11:41 PM) http://volokh.com/2010/01/21/plain-view-for-computer-searches-generates-
two-circuit-splits-in-two-days-united-states-v-williams-and-united-states-v-mann/. 
156 Mann, 592 F.3d at 781 (noting that the case agents used software employing a filter to 
view the files tagged by an “Alert,” which flags “those files identifiable from a library of 
known files previously submitted by law enforcement—most of which are images of child 
pornography”). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 784. 
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computer files for voyeurism.  In declining to accept the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s approach, the court stated that “[a]lthough the Ninth Circuit’s 
rules provide some guidance in a murky area, we are inclined to find 
more common ground with the dissent’s position that jettisoning the 
plain view doctrine entirely in digital evidence cases is an ‘efficient 
but overbroad approach.’”159 
Courts should adopt the approach of the Tenth and Seventh Cir-
cuits when determining whether seizure of electronic data is reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment.  This approach is the only one 
that has successfully treaded the line between completely eliminating 
the plain view doctrine and turning a warrant to search a computer 
into a wholesale license to search and potentially seize a computer’s 
entire contents. 
Indeed, an approach which treats a file as a container and applies 
the inadvertence requirement could have addressed the general con-
cerns of the Ninth Circuit inherent to computer searches that gener-
al warrants will result when officers are allowed to seize and search 
computers unchecked through the use of the plain view doctrine.  
General warrants are not a possibility since the computer is not the 
“container.”  Instead, each file on a computer’s hard drive is the 
“container” for purposes of the warrant.  Thus, a warrant to search a 
computer is not treated like a warrant to search the entire contents of 
a suitcase.  A court, following this approach, must ask whether each 
file was opened in an attempt to comply with the warrant, not just 
whether the computer was seized pursuant to the warrant.  Then, if 
an officer wishes to seize a file on a computer through the plain view 
doctrine, he must show that he came across the evidence in that file 
inadvertently, i.e., in good faith, and not in an attempt to uncover 
evidence outside the scope of the warrant. 
Further, treating each file as a separate container will preserve a 
defendant’s (and any third party’s) privacy interest in the documents 
being searched that are not subject to the warrant by guaranteeing 
that an officer’s search of a computer is narrowly tailored.  An officer 
must reasonably believe that a file is related to the target of a search 
before he can open it.  If an officer does so and still comes across in-
formation not covered by the warrant, that information may only be 
seized if it is discovered inadvertently.  These extra protections will 
narrow the scope of electronic data that can reasonably be seized with 
 
159 Id. at 785 (citation omitted).  The Seventh Circuit went on to say, “[a]s the dissent recog-
nizes, there is nothing in the Supreme Court’s case law (or the Ninth Circuit’s for that 
matter) counseling the complete abandonment of the plain view doctrine in digital evi-
dence cases.”  Id. 
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a warrant, which, in turn, will help to preserve the privacy interests of 
those involved. 
Critics of this approach note that courts are generally reluctant to 
engage in an analysis of an officer’s subjective intent.160  Courts would 
necessarily have to do so in assessing whether an officer came across 
electronic data inadvertently.  This is undoubtedly difficult, yet not 
impossible.  Certainly, the court in Carey did just that.  As the com-
plexity of technology and the sophistication of criminals increase, so 
too does the likelihood that an officer will need to search all, or most-
ly all, of the files on a computer to be certain that he has completed 
his search.  In light of this, the intent of the officer becomes much 
more important in assessing the reasonableness of a seizure of elec-
tronic information and whether it comports with the Fourth 
Amendment and the plain view doctrine.  It may be the only way to 
both preserve the integrity of the plain view exception to the warrant 
requirement and prevent general warrants.  Any difficulties in con-
ducting an analysis of an officer’s subjective intent are far outweighed 
by these benefits. 
VI.  THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE AND COMPUTER SEARCHES AFTER THE 
COMPREHENSIVE DRUG TESTING, INC. AMENDED PER CURIAM OPINION 
In the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s recent per curiam opinion, the 
plain view doctrine’s place in the realm of intermingled data remains 
uncertain.  While this new opinion has most likely eliminated the 
possibility of certiorari to the Supreme Court, Judge Kozinski is un-
doubtedly correct when he notes that this issue is “important and 
likely often to arise again.”161  The Ninth Circuit no longer mandates 
that the government waive reliance on this doctrine in computer 
searches, yet it is unclear how and to what extent the government 
may use it.  The per curiam opinion does not expressly disavow use of 
the plain view doctrine, though it does reject the government’s at-
tempts in this instance as “too clever by half.”162  The case agent in 
 
160 See Recent Cases, Fourth Amendment—Plain View Doctrine—En Banc Ninth Circuit Holds that the 
Government Should Waive Reliance on Plain View Doctrine in Digital Contexts-—United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1003, 1009 (2010) (“While the virtual file approach is preferable to eliminating the 
plain view doctrine altogether, there is at least one significant drawback:  admissibility of 
evidence outside the scope of the warrant hinges primarily on the investigating agent’s 
subjective intent, which may be impossible to discern with certainty.”). 
161 United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354, 
2010 WL 3529247 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2010), at *14 (per curiam) (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
162 Id. at *6. 
788 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 13:3 
 
CDT expressly disregarded the instructions in the search warrant 
when he did not allow computer forensic personnel to examine and 
segregate the data but instead did it himself.163 
Still, the question remains:  when dealing with intermingled elec-
tronic data, when a search warrant provides no guidance, is the plain 
view exception to the warrant requirement compatible with the pro-
cedures dictated by Tamura?164  Undoubtedly, yes—at least under cer-
tain circumstances.  The interaction between the two doctrines is 
complicated and made even more so by the abrogation of the inad-
vertence requirement in Horton in 1990.  Tamura dictates that evi-
dence outside the scope of a warrant generally may not be seized.  
Thus, when an officer determines that data is so intermingled it can-
not feasibly be sorted onsite, that data should be sealed and held un-
til a magistrate can determine how to proceed.165  When Tamura was 
originally decided in 1982, the Ninth Circuit contemplated a situa-
tion in which an officer executing a search warrant inadvertently 
identified evidence outside the scope of the warrant.  In that case, ac-
cording to Tamura, it was possible for a reasonable seizure of evi-
dence to include that inadvertently discovered evidence.166 
In CDT, the government knew prior to the execution of the search 
warrant that electronic documents were so intermingled that they 
would need to be seized in full and sorted off site.  In situations like 
this, Tamura dictates that the government should apply to the magi-
strate ahead of time for permission to seize the data in full.  But, 
when Tamura was decided in 1982, none of the intermingled docu-
ments that fell outside of the warrant’s scope could be seized and 
used as evidence in another crime under the plain view exception 
because their discovery was not inadvertent. 
Since Horton and the abrogation of the inadvertence requirement, 
theoretically everything outside the scope of the warrant found while 
searching through intermingled data on a computer could come into 
plain view.  This is true even if the officer knows with a high degree of 
certainty, as he did in CDT, that he will find inculpatory evidence not 
covered by the warrant.  This was the fear of the court in the per cu-
riam CDT opinion: 
 
163 Id. at *5. 
164 See id. at *13 (“We have updated Tamura to apply to the daunting realities of electronic 
searches.”). 
165 United States v. Tamura, 694 F.2d 591, 594–96 (9th Cir. 1982). 
166 Id. at 595, n.1 (“This rule is subject to an exception which permits the seizure of contra-
band or other incriminating evidence found inadvertently during the execution of a 
search warrant.”). 
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The point of the Tamura procedures is to maintain the privacy of mate-
rials that are intermingled with seizable materials, and to avoid turning a 
limited search for particular information into a general search . . . . If the 
government can’t be sure whether data may be concealed . . . without 
carefully examining the contents of every file . . . then everything the 
government chooses to seize will . . . automatically come into plain 
view. . . . Let’s take everything back to the lab, have a good look around 
and see what we might stumble upon.167 
When officers are aware that they will encounter intermingled 
electronic data prior to the execution of the search warrant, reinstat-
ing the inadvertence requirement as part of the plain view doctrine 
presents a solution that is consistent with Tamura.  This approach will 
also serve to protect and preserve privacy rights, without completely 
eliminating the plain view doctrine. 
Applying the inadvertence requirement to the facts of CDT, it is 
obvious that the officer’s seizure of over one hundred names in the 
Tracey Directory cannot be justified by the plain view doctrine.  
There is strong evidence that the officer who searched the Directory 
knew that he would encounter test results for players other than the 
ten mentioned in the warrant.  Not only did the seizing officer in 
CDT remark that his rationale for taking the entire Directory was to 
give him an opportunity to “briefly peruse it to see if there was any-
thing above and beyond that which was authorized for seizure in the 
initial warrant,”168 but the government applied to the magistrate judge 
before execution of the search warrant for advanced authorization to 
sort the intermingled data offsite.169  It is likely that the officer seized 
the entire Directory in an attempt to ascertain which other baseball 
players had tested positive for steroid use.  Applying the inadvertence 
requirement, it follows that the evidence pertaining to individuals 
other than the ten specifically mentioned in the search warrant could 
not have properly been admitted as evidence in court under the plain 
view doctrine.  Thus, eliminating the plain view doctrine in its entire-
ty is an unnecessary and overbroad solution to cases such as this. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While the guidelines that were a controversial component of the 
decision in CDT have since been relegated to the concurrence of the 
Ninth Circuit’s recently amended per curiam opinion, they are still key 
to understanding the complexities of searches and seizures of elec-
 
167 Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 2010 WL 3529247, at *6. 
168 Id. at *23 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
169 Id. at *5. 
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tronic data.  Importantly, the total elimination of the plain view ex-
ception to the warrant requirement has been rejected by multiple 
circuits—the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth circuits have all approved 
of its use.  But, given the inherent differences between physical and 
computer searches and seizures, allowing officers to justify seizures 
beyond the scope of a search warrant by blindly relying on the plain 
view doctrine could easily result in massive over-seizing of data, as 
well as the possibility that specific warrants will become general ones.  
A preferable approach is to follow the Seventh and Tenth Circuits in 
adopting the “virtual file” approach and reinstating the inadvertence 
requirement.  This approach should also be applied in cases like 
CDT, dealing with intermingled electronic data. 
Since the amended opinion, it is unclear precisely how govern-
ment officials in the Ninth Circuit will proceed while conducting 
searches of electronic data.  Will they conform to the guidelines 
completely and abandon the use of the plain view doctrine in an ef-
fort to get a “safe harbor” in court?  Or will they continue to rely on 
that doctrine and force the courts to address this question, yet again?  
Indeed, one thing is certain:  though Judge Kozinski’s controversial 
guidelines in the en banc decision in U.S. v. Comprehensive Drug Test-
ing, Inc. were ultimately consigned to a non-binding concurrence, 
echoes of their impact will surely reverberate ad infinitum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
